Abstract U.S. Prison health care has recently been in the news and in the courts. A particular issue is whether prisons should contract out for health care. Contracting out has been growing over the past few decades. The stated motivation for this change ranges from a desire to improve the prison health care system, sometimes in response to a court mandate, to a desire to reduce costs. This study is a first attempt to quantify the impact of this change on inmate health. As morbidity measures are not readily obtainable, we focus on mortality. More specifically, we use a panel of state prisons from 1979-1990 and a fixed effects Poisson model to estimate the change in mortality associated with increases in the percentage of medical personnel employed under contract. In contrast to the first stated aim of contracting, we find that a 20 percent increase in percentage of medical personnel employed under contract increases mortality by 2 percent.
Introduction
There has been a large increase in contracting out for health care in U.S. 1 While this is a big company, the market for outsourced medical care is much larger still. The president of PHS estimates that $3 billion of the $7 billion spent on penal medical care is contracted out (Business Week 2005).
While there are concerns that prison health care contracting out leads to understaffing and under-treatment (Robbins 1999) , it is also possible that outsourcing produces efficiency gains by applying the principles of managed health care and thereby reduces costs without reducing quality. In fact, contracting out has sometimes been instituted in response to court orders as a means of improving prison health care quality (McDonald 1999) . The argument for outsourcing as a means to improve quality rests on 3 the notion that independent organizations (often, but not necessarily profit-seeking firms)
are more flexible and efficient than governmentally operated prison health care staffs.
For one thing, contract health care providers are allowed to pay professionals wages that exceed state-mandated pay schedules that are often too low for difficult work in prisons in isolated areas (Gater 2005) . 2 Profit-seeking firms also have better incentives to produce care more efficiently because managers are allowed to keep the residual earned by reducing costs (Alchian and Demsetz 1972 , Boardman and Vining 1989 , Frech 1976 , Fizel and Nunnikhoven 1992 .
While there is a substantial literature examining the relative efficiency of government versus private firms in the context of goods produced directly for markets, such as insurance or privatization of state-owned enterprises (Ehrlich, Gallais-Hamonno, Lieu, 1994 , Boardman and Vining 1989 , Frech 1976 , Shleifer 1998 , to the best of our knowledge only Hart, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) formally models contracting for services that are not bought on the open market. They set up a simple model where the provider, either a government employee or a private contracting firm can invest in either improving quality (which also tends to raise price) or reducing cost (which also tends to reduce quality). They show that private contractors have stronger incentives to both improve quality and reduce costs than government employees. The problem is that private contractors may have incentives that are too strong to reduce costs, since they ignore the adverse impact on quality. They apply the model to the question of privatizing entire prisons. Like contracting out for prison health care, privatizing entire prisons is growing in popularity in the U.S., though it is much less common than contracting out 4 health care alone. 3 Their model suggests that prisons are not good candidates for privatization because of the possibility for significant reductions in quality as a byproduct of reducing costs. And, of course, inmates are not effective monitors of quality.
Consistent with this prediction, they present limited evidence that private prisons have both lower costs and lower quality.
Given the theoretically ambiguous impact of prison health care contracting out on the quality of inmate health care, the objective of this study is to quantify the impact.
Ideally, we would include measures of morbidity and mortality. Unfortunately, morbidity data is not readily available. As such, we focus on mortality. In particular, we use Census of Prison data from 1979-1990 and a fixed effects Poisson model to estimate the impact of increases in health care outsourcing on inmate mortality. We find a negative effect of contracting out on health (a positive effect on death). More specifically, we find that a 20 percent increase in percentage of medical personnel employed under contract increases mortality by 2 percent.
Prison Health Care Contracting

The History of Court Involvement
Before the federal courts began intervening, health care in American prisons was poor and limited. Prison officials often considered medical care as a privilege, rather than a right. It was sometimes withheld to discipline inmates. Care was often dispensed by retired military corpsmen and untrained inmate nurses. The few physicians that existed often had restricted institutional licenses (McDonald 1999 , Anno 2004 There are also generally higher standards that are not specific to prisons that some prisons do meet. The seemingly high level of prison health care spending described above underlies public policy towards cost control, including contracting out. But, one should be careful making comparisons between inmate and non-inmate medical expenditures.
Prison Health Care Costs and Health Status
While prisoners are quite young, they are generally thought to be less healthy than the population at large and therefore to need more medical services. However, the evidence 7 for this is mixed. For example, death rates in prisons are lower than for the general population, after controlling for race, sex and age, though they are higher for infectious disease and suicide (McDonald 1999) . In a study of the Cook County (Chicago) Jail, Kim et al (2006) found a 68 percent lower adjusted mortality rate for inmates than for the general population. On the other hand, when prisoners are released, their death rates jump and become much higher than those of the general population. In a study of former Washington State inmates, the adjusted death rate for the former inmates was 3.5 times the state's overall death rate (Binswanger et al 2007) .
We know of only one nationwide analysis of prison health care costs, done by Hyde and Brumfield (2003) to be effective. They examine the initiation of small copayments ($3.00 for a sick care visit and $2.00 for a prescription) in Idaho prisons in 1998. 5 As one might expect, the number of sick care requests declined by about 40 percent. This result is roughly consistent with, though slightly larger than, the classic RAND study comparing free care to small copayments (Newhouse et al 1981 and 1993) . However, the comparison is not perfect as there is likely to be significant non-price rationing in prisons, especially in the absence of copayments.
Prison Health Care Quality and Outcomes
Our knowledge about the impact of contracting out on the quality of prison health care is limited to case studies from Texas, Baltimore and Salt Lake City. As a result of successful inmate lawsuits in the early 1990s, the U. Lastly, Szykula and Jackson (2005) detail a case study for managed mental health techniques in a large Salt Lake City jail. They report lower costs and much lower levels of psychotropic medication of the inmates after the initiation of manage care.
Inmate Mortality Data
We construct a balanced three year panel from the 1979 and 1984 Census of State Adult
Correction Facilities and the 1990 Census of State and Federal Adult Correction
Facilities. The sample is restricted to these three years because they are the only surveys that include the necessary data. Because federal data are only reported in 1990, the panel is also restricted to state prisons. All data are self reported at the institution level. As the objective is to estimate the impact of medical contracting on inmate mortality, we restrict the sample to facilities that are likely to offer at least some amount of medical care. The remaining control variables, other than the prison fixed effects, are listed in Table 2 . All models include the number of professional staff, the number of other staff, prison population, prison capacity, prison security level, and the number of inmates killed in the past year. The number of inmates killed is a proxy for social conditions in the prison. The columns in Table 2 report these summary statistics for a variety of subsamples. Our primary sample includes all prisons with a minimum capacity of 100
inmates and a positive number of professional staff in each of the three years. Column 2 11 restricts the sample to prisons with a hospital, a shared hospital, or an infirmary and column 3 restricts the sample to just prisons with a hospital. Columns 4 and 5 restrict the sample to prisons with an average capacity of 500+ and 1000+, respectively. We use these samples in Section 4 to check the sensitivity of the results to various sample specifications.
Fixed Effects Poisson Model
The objective is to estimate the impact of medical contracting in prisons on inmate mortality:
where i denotes prisons, t=1979, 1984, or 1990 , M is the annual prison-level mortality count, a is a vector of prison fixed effects, f is a vector of year indicators, C is the proportion of professional staff employed on contract (ranges from 0 to 1), P is the number of professional staff, X is a vector of time-varying prison characteristics, and ε is the usual error term. The central feature of our prison mortality data is that it is a nonnegative count with a large number of zeros (see Table 3 and Figure 1 ). As such, we estimate equation (1) using a fixed effects Poisson model. We also report OLS estimates for comparison.
The estimates for equation (1) The other coefficients are reported in the remaining rows of Table 4 . Focusing on column 1, as one might expect, mortality falls as professional staff increases. On the other hand, increases in non-professional staff and prison population are associated with increases in inmate mortality. Also as expected, the trend in prison mortality is upward. Table 5 replicates columns 1 through 4 in Table 4 under a variety of sample specifications. For comparative purposes the first row reports the baseline estimates.
The second row restricts the sample to prisons with a hospital, shared hospital, or an 
Medical Staff Measurement Problems
For our purposes, the primary flaw of available data is the fact that medical staff is not slightly to 8.8 percent for medical staff and 8.0 for other professionals. Taken as a whole these finding suggest that proxying medical contracting with professional contracting is likely to be fairly reliable.
Endogenous Medical Contracting
The analysis of the impact of medical contracting on prisoner mortality raises the question of endogeneity. More concretely, one may be concerned that the results partly reflect the decision of prisons with high and rising death rates to switch towards medical 15 contracting to slow the rise in the death rate. 7 As we have three years of data, we can investigate this possibility by relating changes in mortality in the earlier period to contracting out choices in the later period. We estimate the following simple model: The results are reported in columns 1 and 2 in Table 7 . Whether mortality includes or excludes suicides, there is no relationship between the change in mortality between 1979 and 1984 and the change in medical contracting between 1984 and 1990.
The point estimates are zero to three decimal places and the standard errors are small. In order to check the sensitivity of this finding to alternative specifications, columns 3 through 8 replace the change in mortality with the level of mortality in 1984, 1979, both and 1979 and 1984 . The results for all specifications are similar: the data indicate that prisons did not respond to mortality changes by changing the percentage of their medical staff employed under contract, at least during the period of for which we have data.
Conclusion
We find no evidence to support the positive rhetoric regarding the impact of prison health care contracting out on inmate health, at least as measured by mortality. Our findings of higher inmate mortality rates under contracting out are more consistent with recent editorials raising concerns about this method of delivering health care to inmates. In fact, Future work on the important issues of prison health care contracting would benefit from better data on costs and on the details of the incentives created by different types of contracts. Further, one might distinguish between contracting out to profitseeking versus nonprofit firms. And, it would be useful to repeat this study for more recent data. All of these approaches require new datasets, going beyond the Census. Bold coeffcients are statistically significant at the 5% level and bold italics are statistically significant at the 10% level. Unweighted.
